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A simplified mechanism is a direct mechanism modified by restricting the set of 
reports or bids. An example is the auction used to place ads on Internet search 
pages, in which each advertiser bids a single price to determine the allocation of 
eight or more ad positions on a page. If a simplified mechanism satisfies the 
“best-reply-closure” property, then all Nash equilibria of the simplified 
mechanism are also equilibria of the original direct mechanism. For search 
advertising auctions, suitable simplifications eliminate inefficient, low-revenue 
equilibria that are favored in the original direct mechanism when bidding costs 
are positive.  
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I. Introduction 
Real-world auctions are often much simpler than the direct mechanisms which are 
the focus of economic theory. The latter are impractical for large auctions with many 
items for sale, for the sheer number of combinations of items makes determining and 
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expressing all the relevant values too costly. Simplified mechanisms that reduce the 
number of required bids can help, but raises the question of how the mechanism’s 
performance is affected. This paper initiates the study of that question with the finding 
that well-chosen simplifications can sometimes improve mechanism performance by 
eliminating undesirable equilibria.  
One way to reduce the number of bids used by a direct mechanism is to conflate 
distinct allocations or events, so that a bid that applies to one is required to apply also to 
others. A very common example arises in auctions where each bidder is allowed only to 
specify values or bids that depend only its own goods assignment, rather than on the 
entire allocation. This example and certain others seem easily explained as respecting an 
approximate pattern of preferences, so it is more enlightening and convincing to look at 
an example in which conflation is used in a different way.  
An interesting simplified auction mechanism is the world’s most frequently used 
auction, which is initiated whenever a user types text into in a search box like those 
provided by Yahoo! or Google. For each search, an automated auction runs to determine 
the placement of advertisements into multiple positions—currently eight at Google and 
twelve at Yahoo!—on the search results page. In the earliest search auctions, bidders in 
an automated auction could offer a separate price for each position and a sequence of 
first-price auctions determined the winners. Each bidder in the series of auctions was 
permitted to win a single ad position.
2 In this early incarnation, the auction entailed no 
simplification.  
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As currently administered, the would-be participants in a search auction identify 
search terms that will trigger their bids and specify a price per click for each term; they 
also specify the ad to run if the bid is winning. The auctioneer converts the per-click bid 
of each bidder into a per-impression bid by multiplying it by an estimate of the number of 
clicks the ad would experience if it were shown in the first position on the page. The 
highest bidder wins the top position; the second highest wins the next position; and so on. 
An advertiser pays only when its ad is actually clicked and then pays only the smallest 
bid per click that would have won the same ad position.  
This mechanism, dubbed the “generalized second-price auction,” is equivalent to 
a series of second price auctions with separate per-impression bids for each position, but 
with two restrictions. The first restriction is similar to that of earlier search advertising 
auctions: an advertiser who wins one position on a page is excluded from bidding for the 
lower positions. The second restriction is a simplification: an advertiser’s per-impression 
bid for the n
th position in the sequence is determined by its bid for first position, but 
scaled down in proportion to the lower number of expected clicks for the n
th position.  
In a pair of recent papers, Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwartz (2007) and Varian 
(2006) have studied the generalized second-price auctions using the assumptions that 
bidders value all clicks on ads equally (regardless of the position of the ad) and that 
bidder payoffs are equal to the value of their clicks minus the total prices they pay. A 
central finding of both papers is that the prices and assignments of positions resulting 
from a selected full-information Nash equilibrium of the generalized second price auction 
is the same as for the dominant strategy equilibrium of a multi-item Vickrey auction.    4
This theory leaves several unanswered questions about sponsored search auctions. 
First, why do advertisers pay on a per-click basis, rather than on the per-impression basis 
that is most commonly used for print ads and for radio and television advertising? In a 
static full-information environment, there would be little to distinguish between these 
different approaches to pricing, although per-click charges are easier for an Internet 
advertiser to audit because it can meter visits to its own website.  
There is a second important advantage to per-click pricing. Search companies 
have continually expanded their scope in various ways, showing ads on a wider variety of 
sites and encouraging advertisers to use “extended match” technologies to place ads not 
only on pages that match the bidder’s search term exactly but also on pages that match 
approximately. As an illustration, the extended search technology might deem the term 
“ink cartridge” to be sufficiently related to the term “printer cartridge” and might show an 
ad for the latter when the search is made for the former. The relation among these search 
terms is imperfect, for example because “ink cartridge” might be entered by a user 
searching for a pen ink refill, so the proportion of searchers who are potential customers 
for a printer ink company may be lower for the related term, which makes each 
impression less valuable. Even click values may be different, because clicks from pen ink 
searchers would less frequently result in actual sales. Still, pricing ads on a per click basis 
reduces the advertiser’s cost per impression for ads on less closely related search results 
pages, which makes more advertisers willing to agree to use the extended search 
technology. This explanation is part of a recurring theme of our analysis: per-click 
bidding is a simplification that reduces the number of bids required and increases the 
scope of each, raising reported demand and increasing the seller’s revenues and profits.    5
Another question concerns not the distinction between price-per-click and price-
per-impression bids, but the choice of auction rules. If, as the prior literature asserts, the 
Vickrey outcome is a desirable one, then why not just use the Vickrey mechanism instead 
of the generalized second-price auction?
3 Not only does that mechanism implement the 
desired outcome using dominant strategies rather than merely full-information Nash 
equilibrium, but it does so for a realistically wider class of environments in which the 
value of a click may depend on the position of the ad in addition to the search term.  
We divide this relatively broad question into two narrower ones by treating the 
generalized second-price auction as differing from the Vickrey mechanism in two ways. 
First, its bids are simplifications: there are one-dimensional while the value reports 
required by the Vickrey mechanism (and those required by earlier search auctions) are 
multidimensional. Second, given the vector of values that might be imputed from the 
one-dimensional bids, the pricing of the ad positions is determined not by the Vickrey 
formula but by a sequence of second price auctions.
4 These two differences suggest two 
corresponding questions. First, if pricing is to be set by a sequence of second price 
auctions, why does the auctioneer then accept only a single price per click and impute 
values to all positions instead of allowing multidimensional bids that state directly all the 
relevant values? Would the same explanation apply if the Vickrey pricing rule had been 
used? Second, if the auctioneer must use a single, one-dimensional bid and impute values 
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for the different positions, what advantage might it enjoy by using a sequence of second-
price auctions rather than the Vickrey auction?  
To answer the first question, we observe that in any series of second-price 
auctions, it is the losing bids for the various positions that determine the prices. If 
individual bids for each position were permitted but not required and if there were any 
arbitrarily small positive cost incurred by a bidder in submitting individual bids, then 
there would be no pure, full-information equilibrium at which the seller earns positive 
revenue, because losing bidders for a position would never make positive bids.
5 Even 
when the cost of submitting bids is zero, the series of second price auctions with 
individual bids still admits these zero-revenue strategy profiles as Nash equilibria. 
Similar arguments imply that the Vickrey pricing rule never yields positive revenue in a 
pure, full-information equilibrium when there are positive bidding costs and that these 
zero-revenue equilibria persist even when bidding costs are zero. In contrast, every 
equilibrium of the generalized second price auction for two or more items awards 
positive revenues to the seller, because a bidder whose positive bid is winning for 
position n also enforces a positive price for position n–1. We will argue below that this 
analysis, which here seems tailored to exploit the particular structure of the generalized 
second price and Vickrey auctions, nevertheless applies more broadly and illustrates a 
general principle of mechanism design: certain kinds of simplifications reduce the set of 
pure Nash equilibria—often by eliminating inefficient or low-revenue equilibria—
without introducing additional pure equilibria.  
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For the second question, although the received literature already includes analyses 
highlighting important disadvantages of the Vickrey pricing formula in multi-item 
auctions (Ausubel and Milgrom (2005), Rothkopf (2007)), the most devastating 
objections apply only to auctions in which bidders can buy multiple items. Those 
objections have no force for sponsored search auctions, because each bidder in such an 
auction is restricted to buy at most a single position.  
Our answer to the second question focuses on the special environment of 
sponsored search, for which a distinct analysis is needed. We extend the models used in 
earlier studies to allow heterogeneity among searchers. We assume that there are two 
kinds of searchers—some are potential customers who are actually looking for a product 
to buy and others are merely curious about the products being advertised—with each 
group having its own click rates for ads occupying different positions on the page. For 
example, it may be that clicks on ads near the bottom of a search page come more 
frequently from potential customers because these searchers more often attend to the full 
list of the ads. In that case, if clicks from potential customers are more valuable than 
clicks from other searchers, then clicks on ads near the bottom of a page will be more 
valuable than clicks on ads near the top, because a higher proportion of these clicks will 
come from potential buyers. In general, we need only assume that the click rates for the 
groups are different to conclude that clicks from different positions have different values. 
Our formal model incorporates searcher heterogeneity in a simple way by 
assuming that there are just two groups of searchers: potential customers and others. Each 
advertiser has some positive value per click from potential customers and a zero value per 
click from other searchers and the frequency of clicks from each group falls as one moves   8
down the search page. With these assumptions, the bidders’ types are one-dimensional 
and the value per impression falls as one moves down the page, just as in the prior 
literature. Based on the data at its own site, the auctioneer can observe the empirical click 
rate for each position but not the purchase behavior of clickers once they leave the search 
page. The auctioneer cannot determine from its own observations and a bidder’s reported 
value for an ad in one position what the bidders’ values are for ads in the other positions. 
Therefore, with one-dimensional bids, it has too little information to conduct a proper 
Vickrey auction despite the one-dimensional type spaces. In contrast, the analyses of the 
previously cited papers can be generalized to establish that, even with searcher 
heterogeneity, there may still exist a full-information equilibrium of the generalized 
second price auction in which the realized prices are Vickrey prices. This is possible 
because each bidder can observe how its own clicks from various ad positions convert 
into sales and profits.  
The lessons illustrated about the advantages of limited bidding in sponsored 
search auctions suggest a more expansive theory of simplified mechanisms, which are 
derived from direct mechanisms by restricting the set of allowable reports or bids. A key 
characteristic of successful simplifications is the best-reply-closure property, defined as 
follows: for any participant j, if the other participants play only their own simplified 
strategies, then participant j’s set of simplified strategies includes a best reply to the 
profile of others’ strategies. The simplification used in sponsored search auctions, in 
which each bidder names a single price rather than a vector of prices, satisfies the best-
reply closure property. Our main general theorem asserts if a simplified mechanism has 
the best-reply closure property, then a profile of pure, simplified strategies is a Nash   9
equilibrium of a simplified mechanism if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the 
original mechanism. Such a simplification can eliminate pure equilibria (by eliminating 
one or more of the strategies it uses) but otherwise leaves the set of equilibria unchanged.  
Besides Internet search advertising, a second significant application of simplified 
mechanisms is to the problem of package auctions (also known as combinatorial 
auctions). These are mechanisms in which there are multiple (often heterogeneous) items 
for sale and bidders are potentially interested in buying any packages, that is, subsets of 
the full set of items. With M items for sale and quasi-linear preferences, a full description 
of a bidder’s preferences specifies values for all 2
M – 1 non-empty packages. If a direct 
package auction mechanism were attempted for a sale like FCC spectrum auction #66 in 
which 1122 licenses were offered for sale, a bidder could feasibly compute and report 
values for only an extremely minute fraction of the roughly 10
338 available packages. If 
we model this fact by assuming that bidders can submit a modest number of packages bid 
at no cost but eventually incur a small cost for each additional package bid, then there can 
be a huge number of inefficient and low-revenue equilibria of the full game. We examine 
how a simplified package auction satisfying the best-reply closure property can eliminate 
certain “undesirable” equilibria without introducing new Nash equilibria.  
Our analysis of simplified package bidding treats the class of core-selecting 
package auction mechanisms of Day and Milgrom (2007)—a class of direct mechanisms 
that includes the important menu auction of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the 
ascending proxy auction of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), and many others. For these 
mechanisms, the full-information equilibrium outcomes include all the bidder-optimal 
core allocations.    10
One creates a simplified mechanism from a direct mechanism by restricting 
bidders to report values that are elements of a set V. With a set of items N for sale, a 
typical element vV ∈  is a function  :2
N v + → \  with the property that  ()0 v ∅= . **For 
0 k > , let vk −  denote the value function which assigns to any non-empty package S the 
value  () vS k − . We show that if the actual values lie in the set V and if vV vkV ∈ ⇒ −∈, 
then the best-reply-closure property is satisfied. Consequently, the Nash equilibria of the 
V-simplified mechanism are Nash equilibria of the original mechanism, and these include 
the identified equilibria for which the outcomes are bidder-optimal core allocations.  
Based on the preceding analysis, we suggest some sets V that may be useful for 
applications in which potential value complementarities arise only from shared fixed 
costs. One useful property of our sets V is that they grow only linearly in the number of 
items N, while the full set of package bids grows exponentially in N. We evaluate the 
performance of these simplified mechanisms in particular environments, including ones 
in which the actual values lie outside of V. This analysis allows us to revisit the difficult 
question of whether, when and how prices might be useful in package auction design.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II states and proves the 
simplification theorem, which shows that for general games, simplifications that restrict 
the strategy set to one satisfying the best-reply-closure property shrinks the set of pure 
Nash equilibrium profiles. We also identify a common property of standard auctions—
completeness of the set of bids—that is sufficient to imply the best-reply closure 
property. Section III treats the generalized second price auction of sponsored search.
6 Its 
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first subsections shows that, compared to a series of second price auctions with general 
value reports, the generalized second price auction is a complete simplification (so it 
satisfies the best-reply-closure property) and eliminates certain zero revenue Nash 
equilibria. Its second subsection introduces the model described above with two types of 
searchers and demonstrates that the selected equilibrium of the generalized second price 
auction still establishes Vickrey prices, thus extending the results of prior research. 
Section IV treats package bidding, proving the theorem stated above which identifies a 
class of simplifications that satisfies the best-reply-closure property. Section V concludes.  
II. Simplification and Completeness Theorems  
Let (,,) NXπ  be a normal form game, where  1 ( ,..., ) N X XX = .  
Definition. A product set of strategy profiles  1 ˆˆ ˆ ... N X XX =× × has the best-reply 
closure property in (,,) NXπ  if for every player n and every profile  ˆ
nn x X −− ∈  there 
exists  ˆ
nn x X ∈  such that for all  nn x X ′ ∈ .  ˆˆ (, ) (, ) nn n nn n x xx x ππ −− ′ ≥ .  
When the best-reply closure property holds, a player n looking for a response to 
any opposing pure profile  ˆ
nn x X −− ∈  loses nothing by restricting attention to strategies 
in  ˆ
n X . 
Theorem 1 (Simplification Theorem). Suppose  ˆ X  has the best-reply closure 
property in ( , , ) NXπ . Then, a pure strategy profile  ˆ ˆ x X ∈  is a Nash equilibrium of 
ˆ (,,) NXπ  if and only if it is also a Nash equilibrium of ( , , ) NXπ .   12
Proof. The if direction is obvious. For the only if direction, suppose that  ˆ x is not 
a Nash equilibrium of ( , , ) NXπ . Then there is some player n that has a profitable 
deviation from  ˆ x, that is, for some  nn x X ′ ∈ ,  ˆˆ ˆ (, ) (, ) nn n nn n x xx x ππ −− ′ > . According to the 
best-reply closure property, there is some  ˆ
nn x X ∈  such that  ˆˆ (, ) (, ) nn n nn n x xx x ππ −− ′ ≥ . 
Hence,  ˆˆ ˆ (, ) (, ) nn n nn n x xx x ππ −− > :  ˆ x is not a Nash equilibrium of  ˆ (,,) NXπ .  ♦ 
The interesting part of the simplification theorem is the only if assertion. It says 
that eliminating strategies while preserving the best-reply closure property does not add 
new equilibrium strategy profiles and hence does not extend the set of equilibrium 
outcomes. For applications, the trick is to specify  ˆ X  to eliminate the “bad” equilibria 
while preserving the “good” equilibria and to verify the property, so that no new bad 
equilibria are introduced.  
The simplification theorem has been stated above for equilibria in pure strategies 
and we will apply it in that form. Since mixed strategy equilibria are pure equilibria of a 
game with an enlarged strategy space, there is a corollary for the mixed equilibrium case, 
but it uses the stronger mixed-best-reply closure condition. We state that condition as 
follows: for every mixed strategy profile  ˆ () nj n j X δ−≠ ∈× Δ , there exists  ˆ
nn x X ∈  such that 
for all  nn x X ′ ∈ .  ˆˆ (, ) (, ) nn n nn n x xx x ππ −− ′ ≥ .  
Theorem 2. Suppose  ˆ X  has the mixed-best-reply closure property in ( , , ) NXπ . 
Then, a profile  ˆ () jj X δ ∈× Δ  is a mixed Nash equilibrium of  ˆ (,,) NXπ  if and only if it is 
also a mixed Nash equilibrium of ( , , ) NXπ .   13
The best-reply closure property is useful because it is satisfied by many typical 
simplifications of direct multi-item auction mechanisms. One condition that implies it for 
auctions is based on the how the set of reports is restricted. For this development, we 
distinguish between reports, which specify a whole set of values, and “bids,” which 
specify the value of a particular set. A “winning bid” is then be the value a bidder reports 
for the particular item or package of items assigned to it; all other bids are “losing bids.”  
Our main result depends on two definitions.  
Definition. An auction mechanism is standard if (1) it is a (possibly simplified) 
direct mechanism and (2)  the payment required from any bidder is a function of the 
reports of the other participants and of its own winning bid (and does not depend on the 
bidder’s own losing bids).  
Definition. A simplification of an auction mechanism is complete when for each 
bidder j, each report by the other bidders v-j, each package xj, and each price pj, if there is 
some report vj in the underlying mechanism that wins package xj with winning bid pj, 
then there is a report in the restricted set that wins package xj with winning bid pj.  
From these two definitions, the following is immediate.  
Theorem 3 (Completeness). A complete, standard auction mechanism satisfies 
the best-reply closure property.  
 Completeness is a restriction on the way the set of bids is reduced when an 
auction is simplified. Standard auctions are derived from direct mechanisms and 
encompass all the direct mechanisms commonly discussed in the economics literature.    14
III. Application to Search Auctions 
For this section, we follow the earlier literature by treating bids as prices per 
impression rather than prices per click. As we have already described, this conversion is 
straightforward when search terms are interpreted narrowly; it does not affect the 
strategic analysis in that case.   
Simplified Search Auctions Are Desirable  
Suppose that bidder i’s value of an ad in position n is denoted vin. Each advertiser 
is permitted to acquire only one ad position, so the vector vi completely describes the 
bidder’s values for the possible positions it might acquire. We make the standard 
normalization that a bidder who gets no ad has a zero payoff. Let us initially suppose that 
there is a small cost ε of submitting a positive bid for each position. In this model, there is 
no best reply to any pure strategy profile that entails a positive losing bid, so in particular 
the usual dominant strategy analysis for the Vickrey auction fails. That analysis does, 
however, have a useful counterpart in the model with costly bidding: if bidder i submits a 
positive bid  0 in in vb ≠>  for just one position, then that bid is weakly dominated by 
in in bv = . By inspection, if bidders bid only for the items that would be assigned to them 
in an efficient allocation, then the corresponding singleton bids  in in bv =  describe a Nash 
equilibrium. Summarizing:  
Theorem 4. In any pure strategy equilibrium of the Vickrey auction game with 
costly bidding, the seller’s revenue is zero. If the equilibrium bids are undominated, then 
the winner i of position n bids  in in bv =  for that position. There is a zero-revenue 
undominated equilibrium in which the items are assigned efficiently. This efficient zero-  15
revenue equilibrium bid profile is also a (dominated) pure Nash equilibrium when the bid 
cost is zero.  
 The Vickrey auction thus has undesirable Nash equilibrium properties when there 
is even an arbitrarily small cost of reporting bids. To make an analogous statement for a 
series of second price auction, we let the vector  1 ( ,..., ) ii i N bb b =  denote the bids that 
advertiser i is prepared to make for each of the N positions. To keep notation simple, let 
us permute the bidder indexes so that bidder 1 is the bidder who wins the first position, 
bidder 2 the second, and so on. Let  max nj n j n Lb > =  denote the second highest (“losing”) 
bid for position n. In the sequence of second-price auctions, this is the price paid by 
bidder n to acquire ad position n. If bidder n makes Kn positive bids, then its payoff is 
nn n n vLK ε −− .  
Theorem 5. In any pure strategy equilibrium of the sequence of second price 
auctions with costly bidding, the seller’s revenue is zero. If the equilibrium bids are 
undominated, then the winner i of position n bids  in in bv =  for that position. There is a 
zero-revenue undominated equilibrium in which the items are assigned efficiently. This 
same bid profile is also a pure Nash equilibrium when the bid cost is zero. 
In both the Vickrey auction and the sequence of second price auctions, the 
revenue result reverses when the strategy sets are simplified.  
For the Vickrey auction, suppose we follow the earlier papers in assuming that 
bidder values per click do not depend on the ad position and that the click rate on an ad in 
position n is some fixed from αn of the rate in position 1, where  1 1 ... 0 N αα => > > . 
Then,  12 (1, ,..., ) ii N vvαα = ; the bidder’s value space is one-dimensional. The auctioneer   16
needs only to ask each bidder for a bid bi1 for the first position. Since the auctioneer can 
observe α, it can compute the Vickrey prices for each bidder and position. In the resulting 
game, if there are positive bidding costs, any bid  11 0 ii vb ≠>  is weakly dominated by the 
bid  11 ii bv = .In an undominated pure equilibrium, each of the bidders with the N highest 
values will prefer to make positive bids and the other bidders will prefer to bid zero. 
Position N will have a price of zero, but the price of any position nN <  is at least 
1 () 0 nN N b αα −> , since the opportunity cost of position n is not less than the gain from 
reassigning bidder N to that more valuable position.  
Theorem 6. With  1 N >  positions for sale, at least N bidders, and zero or small 
positive bidding costs, there is no zero-revenue equilibrium of the simplified Vickrey 
auction. At any pure equilibrium, the price paid for position N will be zero, but all other 
prices will be strictly positive.  
A similar analysis applies to using single bids for a sequence of second-price 
auction. This is precisely the generalized second-price auction.  
Theorem 7. With N>1 positions for sale and zero or small positive bidding costs, 
there is no zero-revenue equilibrium of the generalized second price auction. The price 
paid for position N will be zero, but all other prices will be strictly positive. 
Only the cases with zero bidding costs are formally applications of the 
Simplification Theorem. For those cases, the zero-revenue Nash equilibria are eliminated 
by simplifying the strategy set for the Vickrey auction or the series of second-price 
auctions, but certain positive revenue equilibria remain. We have included positive 
bidding costs in this analysis because they select certain interesting equilibria and   17
because they are an integral part of the reason for making simplifications, providing a 
bridge connecting the theories of sponsored search and package bidding.  
The One-Dimensional Vickrey Pricing Rule is Undesirable 
We have just seen that, in a particular model, a simplification that enables the 
auctioneer to implement Vickrey pricing from one-dimensional bids. If Vickrey pricing is 
both implementable and desirable, why does the search auctioneer not do that? Does to 
the generalized second-price auction have a heretofore unrecognized advantage?  
The answer offered here uses the fact that the preceding analysis incorporates an 
unjustified assumption, namely, that the value of clicks is independent of the position of 
the ad. To explore an alternative, we introduce heterogeneity among searchers, supposing 
that there are two types. Searchers of one type (“potential buyers) are looking for a 
product to buy while those of the other (“curious searchers”) are merely looking for 
information. The ratio of curious searchers to potential buyers is denoted by λ.  
In the prior literature, it is supposed that a searcher’s click rate on an ad is 
determined by multiplying the ad’s “clickability” times the click rate for the position. 
Here, we assume the same. For potential buyers, the relative click rate on an ad in 
position n is αn; for curious others, it is βn. We assume that  1 ... 0 N αα >> > and 
1 ... 0 N ββ >> >, but we do not assume that the two series are proportional. For example, 
if the attention of curious searchers flags more quickly than that of potential buyers, then 
the sequence  / nn β α  would be decreasing.  
We assume that only clicks by potential buyers are valuable to advertisers, so the 
value of an ad in position n is  in vα . A bidder can learn this positional value over time by   18
observing its sales from ads in position n. The formulation  in vα  for the matching value 
implies that assortative matching is efficient, that is, the advertiser with the highest value 
vi should be shown in first position, and so on for the other positions. It simplifies the 
exposition to label the bidders so that  1 ... M vv >>  and to assume that there are weakly 
more positions than bidders M N ≥ . Then, at the efficient allocation, position n is 
assigned to bidder n.   
It has long been known that market clearing prices exist for a class of matching 
problems including the one described and further that there is a unique minimal market 
clearing price vector p  which can be computed using linear programming (Koopmans 
and Beckmann (1957)). The minimum equilibrium price  n p  is the shadow price of an 
additional impression in position n. It follows that  n p  is the opportunity cost of the ad 
placed in position n by bidder n, so it is also the Vickrey price paid by bidder n to acquire 
that position.  
Competitive equilibrium prices satisfy constraints that bidder n prefers position n 
to position n–1, that is,  11 nn n nn n vp v p αα −− −≥ −  and, as is familiar from mechanism 
design analyses, the single crossing structure of preferences assumed here ensures that 
these hold as equalities at the minimum competitive equilibrium. Treating 
11 0 NN p α ++ == , it follows that the Vickrey prices are  1 ()
N
nk k kn pp p + = =− = ∑  
() 11 ()
N
kkk knv αα ++ = − ∑ , which is the formula for such prices reported by Edelman, 
Ostrovsky, and Schwartz (2007).    19
The click rate for position n is  nn αλ β + . Although this rate decreases with n, it 
would be a rare coincidence for it to decrease in direct proportion to the value of an ad. 
Since the search company observes clicks but not sales, it varies bids in proportion to 
clicks but not in proportion to value. If bidder i names a price of  1 i b  for position 1 in a 
simplified auction, then the auctioneer can impute a bid for position n as  1 in b γ , where 
11 () / ( ) nnn γ αλ β αλ β =+ +  is the relative click rate for position n, but the auctioneer 
cannot generally infer Vickrey prices from these bids and its other information.  
Is the efficient assignment with the Vickrey price vector p is the outcome of Nash 
equilibrium in the generalized second-price auction? If it is, then it must be that the 
highest bid is made by bidder 1, the second highest by bidder 2, and so on, and that the 
highest losing bidder for each position bids the Vickrey price for that position. Thus, for 
each bidder n for  2,..., 1 nN =+ , it is necessary that the equilibrium bids are 
11 1 / nn n bpγ −− = . The other bids are not uniquely determined, but we may specify that 
bidder 1 bids  11 1 1 bv α =  and that bidders with indexes N+1 and larger bid  1 / nN n N bv α γ = .  
Theorem 8. For the two searcher-type model of this section, there is a pure Nash 
equilibrium of the generalized second-price auction in which the assignment is efficient 
and prices paid by the winning bidders are the Vickrey prices p if and only if the 
corresponding price-per-click sequence  1 {/}
N
nn n p γ =  is decreasing.  
Proof. If the Vickrey-price-per-click sequence  / nn p γ  is not decreasing, then the 
bidders are not ranked in the correct order for an efficient assignment. (For example, if   20
33 44 // pp γγ < , then bidder 4 bids less than bidder 5 and the resulting assignment is 
inefficient.)   
Suppose that  1 {/}
N
nn n p γ =  is decreasing and fix any bidder n. Recall that the 
Vickrey prices are competitive equilibrium prices so no bidder wishes to deviate to 
purchase a different position at prices p. If bidder n raises its bid to win a higher position, 
say position kn < , then the price it must pay is determined by the k
th highest bidder, so it 
is  11 (/)( / ) kk k kkk k p pp γγ γ γ −− >= , so that deviation is unprofitable. If bidder n reduces its 
bid to win a lower position kn > , then the price it must pay is precisely  k p  and the 
deviation is again unprofitable.  ♦ 
Previous literature establishes that the desired equilibrium exists when  0 λ =  or 
more generally when the vector γ is proportional to the vector α, that is, when the seller’s 
estimate of relative values is not too far off. When the values  i v  of the various bidders are 
very close, then this condition is almost necessary, so the generalized second-price 
auction does not work well. When the values variation is larger, this constraint is more 
relaxed.  
In any series of second-price auctions in which advertisers other than j were 
obliged to use one-dimensional strategies, suppose that a best reply by j wins some 
position n. The price j pays in that case is determined by the n
th highest opposing bid. It 
can obtain the same position at the same price with a one-dimensional bid that is the n
th 
highest such bid. Therefore, we have proved the following.  
Theorem 9. The generalized second-price auction is a complete, standard auction 
mechanism.    21
It follows from theorems 3 and 9 that the generalized second-price auction 
satisfies the best-reply closure property, so the Simplification Theorem applies: The pure 
Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction are also equilibria of any 
sequence of second-price auctions with richer strategy sets. As we have seen, there are 
equilibria of the full direct mechanism that entail zero revenues. The generalized second-
price auction as it is actually conducted for sponsored search applications has no such 
equilibria.  
The analysis reported in this section was formulated for application to online 
search, but similar analyses in which bidders are forced to make the same bids for 
different items apply to other Internet advertising auctions. What makes this sort of 
enforced conflation is valuable is that advertising targets can be so highly differentiated. 
For example, a Palo Alto mortgage lender might be prepared to bid high to target a 
refinancing online advertisement to “males aged 35-54, homeowners in Palo Alto, CA, 
with good credit scores whose navigation behavior displays interest in home 
improvement or mortgage refinance and who are not currently visiting a sex or gambling 
site.”  Detailed targeting can be valuable because it improves the matching of ads to 
users, but narrow targeting can also reduce competition and result in low revenues for 
online publishers. Sponsored search is just one example in which a simplified auction that 
conflates distinguishable ad opportunities can increase equilibrium revenues.  
IV. Application to Package Auctions 
In contrast to the assumption made in much economic theorizing that auctions are 
conducted for a single item, many auctions take place in settings where multiple items are 
being sold and the sales interact. This relationship can emerge from budget constraints   22
that prevent independent bidding on separate items. It can also emerge when the goods 
enter the buyer’s production or utility function as substitutes or complements. Although 
such interactions are very common, package auctions, in which bidders can name prices 
for the packages of lots or items they wish to buy, are only infrequently used.
7 More 
often, items/lots/tranches are sold sequentially or in simultaneous sealed bids. The use of 
these alternative arrangements calls for explanation.  
It seems intuitively clear that these one-item-at-a-time auctions are simpler than 
package auctions, although the rubric “simple” is an ambiguous one. One important 
meaning that has received some attention is that computation is much easier for single 
item auctions than for package/combinatorial auctions. A second simplicity notion, which 
we have emphasized in this paper, is that bids are restricted so that bidders are called 
upon to make fewer bids.
8  
Many common single item auctions are simplified package auctions according to 
our definition. For example, a simultaneous second-price auction for N items is a 
simplification of a standard Vickrey package auction for N items in which bidders are 
allowed to make only bids that express values of packages as the sum of the values of 
their constituent items. Also, a simultaneous first-price auction is the simplification of a 
Bernheim-Whinston menu auction with the same bid restriction.  
Many more complex package auctions impose restrictions on bids that qualify 
them as simplified package mechanisms in the sense introduced here. For example, the 
                                                 
7 A recent book by Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg (2005) reports a snapshot of the growing literature on 
package auctions, including reports of applications. Milgrom (2004) describes additional applications. 
8 This type of simplicity is relevant for reporting and computation, too, since the amounts of reporting and 
computing time are functions of the amount of data.    23
City of London procures bus services using a package auction which requires bidders to 
submit a price meeting the reserve for each named route while allowing discounts to be 
offered for combinations of routes (Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2005)).  
Below, we limit attention to simplifications of core-selecting package auctions. 
The underlying direct mechanisms are ones that always select an allocation in the core 
determined by reported values. Among these mechanisms are the menu auctions studied 
by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Those authors showed that for every bidder-optimal 
allocation (meaning a core allocation that is not Pareto dominated for the bidders by any 
other core allocation), there is a coalition-proof equilibrium of the menu auction which 
selects that allocation. If π is the corresponding bidder-optimal core imputation, then the 
equilibrium strategy profile has each bidder j report that each non-empty package S has 
value max( ( ) ,0) jj vS π − , where  j v  is the bidder’s actual value function for packages. 
We denote this report by  jj v π − . 
Day and Milgrom (2007) show that precisely these same profiles of profit-target 
strategies  jj v π −  are Nash equilibria of every core selecting auction mechanism. They 
also show that for every core-selecting auction and every strategy profile of the other 
bidders, bidder j has a best reply of the form  j vk −  for some  0 k ≥ . The theory we 
develop below applies to this whole set of auction mechanisms.  
Consider a simplified core-selecting auction in which bidders are restricted to 
report values in a set V. With a set of items N for sale, a typical element vV ∈  is a 
function  :2
N v + → \  with the property that  ( ) 0 v ∅= . For  0 k > , let vk −  denote the 
value function which assigns to any non-empty package S the value  () vS k − .    24
Definition. The set of values V is closed under fixed costs if for all  0 k > , 
vV vkV ∈ ⇒ −∈. 
A direct application of Theorem 2 of Day and Milgrom (2007) yields the 
following result.  
Theorem 10. Let ΓV be a simplified core-selecting auction with reports restricted 
to lie in the set V. Suppose that V is closed under fixed costs and that actual bidder values 
lie in the set V. Then, ΓV  has the best-reply closure property and the profit-target 
equilibrium strategy profiles identified above for the full mechanism are also equilibrium 
of the simplified mechanism.  
Theorem 10 identifies a class of simplified mechanisms for package bidding. For 
example, V might be the set of values expressed as the sum of item values, minus a 
constant:  () () ,( )
N
n nS vV k S v S k αα ++ ∈ ∈⇔ ∃∈ ∈ ∀ ≠ ∅ = − ∑ \\ . Elements of V could 
express values of collections of items when there is a fixed cost of shipping or a shared 
facility that must be built to use the items. Simplified core-selecting mechanisms using 
this V can be dubbed fixed cost package auctions. 
Among the important features of the fixed cost package auctions is that they 
eliminate many (but not all) coordination failure equilibria. For example, suppose that 
{1, 2, 3} N =  and that there are three bidders. Suppose that bidder 1 values only item 1 and 
has a value of 10; bidder 2 values only items 2 and 3 with values of 10 each and fixed 
costs of 10, and that bidder 3 values the items at 5 each, with no fixed cost. Among the 
Nash equilibria of the full menu auction is one at which bidder 3 wins all the items, 
bidding 15 for the whole set and making no other bids, while bidders 1 and 2 each bid 10   25
for the whole set, making no other bids. There is no corresponding equilibrium of the 
simplified game. If bidders 1 and 2 play only undominated strategies and bid their full 
values for the package of the whole, then the only corresponding equilibrium outcome 
entails an efficient allocation. This illustrates the Simplification Theorem, according to 
which the narrower strategy set can eliminate equilibria but cannot introduce additional 
equilibria.  
Two other important advantages of the fixed cost package auction design are the 
low dimensionality of the reports required from bidders and the fact that for any fixed 
number of bidders, computation time rises only linearly in the number of items for sale.  
Affine Approximation Mechanisms 
Here we propose a simplified mechanism that incorporates the fixed cost package 
auctions while preserving all of its advantages and also extends a design created by the 
author to sell the generating assets of an electric utility company. In the asset sale 
application, two kinds of bidders were expected to participate in the auction—ones that 
wanted to buy all or nearly all of the generating portfolio and others that wanted to buy 
only specific very small parts of the portfolio. For example, the company’s partners in 
ownership of some electric generating facilities might want to buy the selling company’s 
share in order to avoid being saddled with unfamiliar new partners and counterparties to 
certain contracts might want to buy back their commitments. The suggested design 
involved two stages
9 of which the second involved a package auction in which bidders 
for the whole portfolio of assets would be required to specify decrements to be applied to 
their bid for the whole portfolio if some of the individual pieces were sold to others. 
                                                 
9 The first stage involved indicative bids to identify qualified bidders and to determine which assets would 
be open for individual bidding.   26
Partners and counterparties bidders could bid for the individual pieces for which they 
were qualified.  
Generally, we define the affine approximation mechanisms to be simplified core-
selecting auctions in which a bid (,,,) Tr β α  comprises a package T, an offer β for that 
package, individual item prices 
N α + ∈\ , and a radius of approximation r ≥ 1. The bids 
can be used to impute a value function for non-empty packages for the core-determining 
engine according to the formula 
  ()  if max | |,| |
()
0                                             otherwise
nn nST nTS ST TS r
vS
βα α
∈− ∈− ⎧ +− − − ≤ ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⎩
∑∑  
where || ST −  and || TS −  are the numbers of elements in S – T  and TS − , respectively. 
Thus, the tuple ( , , , ) Tr β α  is understood to specify an offer of β for package T and 
adjustments for packages that are similar to T. Adding and/or deleting up to r items from 
the package T alters the bid by adding and subtracting the corresponding item prices. 
Adding and/or subtracting more than r items results in a zero bid (though it is should be 
evident from the logic that other specifications besides zero could also work here). The 
asset sale described above is a further simplification that restricts the sets T and the 
radius r. We denote by  ˆ V  the set of values that can be reported without any restrictions 
on T or r.  
Theorem 11. Let  ˆ V Γ  be the simplification of a standard core-selecting auction 
with reported valuations restricted to lie in  ˆ V . Then, regardless of the bidders’ actual 
valuations, this mechanism has the best-reply closure property. (The same is true even 
when r is restricted, but not when T is restricted.)    27
The proof is a simple application of Theorem 3, because the simplification here is 
complete. To see why, fix some bidder j and strategies in  ˆ V  for the other bidders. 
Suppose there is some best reply report by j that wins some non-empty package T at price 
T p . Let 
N
j α + ∈\  be any vector with the property that for all nT ∈ ,  jn j n αα ′ >  for all 
other bidders  jj ′ ≠  and for nT ∉ ,  0 jn α = . Since the auction selects core allocations 
with respect to the reports, it chooses goods assignments to maximize total value. 
Therefore, the allocation selected by the original best-reply has a higher total value than 
any allocation that excludes j. So, j must still be a winner with the proposed bid. By 
construction, the value-maximizing outcome when j is included assigns package T to j. 
Since the mechanism is standard and j’s winning bid is unchanged, its price is also 
unchanged.  
The preceding argument works for any value of r, so restrictions on r do not 
change the conclusion.  
One interesting aspect of the affine approximation mechanisms is that they use 
something resembling prices to guide the allocation of items among the winning bidders. 
The idea of using item prices to guide package allocation has been repeatedly proposed in 
recent years. It is incorporated in the FCC’s current package bidding algorithm and in the 
dynamic algorithms suggested by Porter, Rassenti, Roopnarine, and Smith (2003) and by 
Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom (2005). All of these mechanisms, however, impose upon 
prices the burden of guiding both the winner determination problem—which bidders 
should be in the winning set—and allocations of items among the winners.    28
The approximation mechanisms do not work that way: they attempt to utilize item 
prices to allocate goods among the winners but not by themselves to determine the set of 
winning bidders. The FCC’s experiments with its package auction design shows that 
these item prices are highly unstable during the course of an ascending auction, 
increasing and decreasing by large amounts over time. In the perspective taken here, the 
proper item prices to guide the allocation of items among winners depends on the set of 
winners. If these are changing during an ascending package auction, then sharp swings in 
the supporting prices are to be expected.   
The affine approximation mechanism with no restrictions on T or r may be useful 
in some settings with small number of items, but as the number of items grows large, they 
may admit too many coordination failure outcomes in which the number of packages 
implicitly bid by each bidder is too small. For some applications, one might require 
rN = , so that all bids are based on a single affine approximation of each bidder’s value 
function. Such a mechanism makes computation easy and transparent and reduces size of 
the bid/report from something that is exponential in N to something that is linear in N. 
More generally, restricting T and/or requiring a wide radius of approximation r or using a 
better approximation than the affine one may be workable simplifications for some 
applications. 
Small Bid Costs 
The idea that bids costs are significant in package auctions even with relatively 
few items seems compelling—with N = 10 items, there are 2
N – 1 = 1023 non-empty 
packages. Nevertheless, the best way to introduce these costs into the analysis is not 
obvious. One particularly simple alternative is to assume that costs are zero for   29
simplifications that make the number of reports rise only linearly in N and the cost is 
otherwise prohibitive. By this standard, the affine approximation auctions described 
above are zero cost mechanisms, while full menu auctions are prohibitively costly. If the 
bid reductions are left to the bidders, there are many equilibria involving coordination 
failures, where packages in the efficient allocation receive no bid at all.  
Another approach to bidding costs, more consistent with the treatment of 
sponsored search auctions above, is to assume that there is some small cost c > 0 of 
reporting each number. The difficulties this poses for equilibrium analysis are most 
simply illustrated by considering the case of a single item for sale: N=1. Suppose there 
are two bidders: a high value bidder 1 with value v1 and a low value bidder 2 with value 
v2. In the second-price auction in this case, the only full-information equilibrium has 
bidder 1 bid v1 while bidder 2 bids zero, so the seller’s revenue is zero. The first-price 
auction has no full information pure equilibrium when bid costs are small and positive. 
For if there were such an equilibrium and the equilibrium price were less than v2, then 
both bidders 1 and 2 would enter, leading to a higher price than v2. Alternatively, if the 
equilibrium price were v2 or higher, then only bidder 1 would enter, so the price would be 
zero. It seems sensible for this case to model small bid costs by focusing on a pure price 
that is a limit of mixed strategy equilibria with random participation by bidder 2. This 
limiting price must be v2, for if the bidder 2 randomizes about entry, its equilibrium profit 
must be zero, so the probability that a bid of  2 vc k −− wins can be no more than  / ck .  
This analysis points to a revenue advantage to using first-price auctions rather 
than second-price auctions when bid costs are positive but small. Day and Milgrom 
(2007) reach an opposite conclusion using a different idea, namely, that it is cheaper to   30
bid straightforwardly than to base each bid on a strategic calculation, so that the cost of 
bidding is less in a second-price auction. This may also encourage more entry. Neither of 
these effects appears in our full-information equilibrium analysis, but that is an outcome 
of the particular and extreme assumptions required for such an analysis. Our model is not 
well suited to assess the comparative importance of these competing effects, but it does 
succeed in highlighting a new and potentially significant effect.  
V. Conclusion 
That simplicity is desirable seems uncontroversial, yet there has been little 
discussion about what “simplicity” means, what advantages it conveys, or what kinds of 
problems result from inappropriate simplifications. Here, we tackle those questions by 
defining a simplified mechanism to be a direct mechanism but with a restriction on the set 
of permissible reports or bids. Packaging multiple goods into lots is a simplification in 
just this sense.  
A common simplification involves conflating two or more distinct assignments 
and applying the same bid to both. Practically every real auction involves some 
conflation, for example because the bid typically depends only on the items acquired by 
the bidder and not on the assignment of the remaining goods. Sponsored search involves 
a further conflation because the same price per click must be offered for all ads for a 
particular search term regardless of the position of the ad on the search page (and, 
sometimes, to similar search terms as judged by an automated algorithm). Treasury bills 
with different serial numbers are such obvious candidates to be conflated that one might 
overlook that requiring the same bid for each bill with the same face value is a 
simplification. It would, of course, be possible to distinguish bills by serial number, but   31
conflating bids to eliminate the distinction conveys the same advantages as the similar 
restriction in of sponsored search: it eliminates low revenue equilibria (including both 
pure and mixed equilibria).
10 Conflation is also used in certain electrical power auctions, 
when “zones” are established within which power or capacity is treated as a single 
undifferentiated commodity. This may be done even though substitution among power 
sources or sinks within a zone is imperfect.  
One implication of all these examples is that conflation can increase competition 
for a set of goods by forcing a bid on one to be a bid on all. Yet not all conflations work 
equally well. In daily electrical power markets, the system operator typically acquires 
both base load generation capacity and load-following regulation—the latter is capacity 
that can produce power that follows the “load” (the power demanded) as it fluctuates 
from minute to minute. In California, losing bids to supply regulation were for a period 
not applied also as bids to supply base load capacity. In this case, a better simplification 
conflates asymmetrically: a bid for regulation should also count as a bid for base load 
capacity. The old system sometimes deprived the market of actually available base-load 
supply resulting in unnecessarily high prices.
11 This California case highlights both the 
tendency of practitioners to adopt simplified auction designs and the importance of 
choosing the right simplification.  
                                                 
10 A T-bill auction that conflates bills with different serial numbers satisfies that best-reply closure property 
holds even in mixed strategies, so theorem 2 applies. To illustrate the advantage of conflations when 
bidding is costly, suppose there are N bills and N+1 bidders, that each bill is worth 1 to each bidder, and 
that each bidder can costlessly bid for one bill but incurs a cost to bid for two or more. Then, the unique 
Nash strategy equilibrium of the simplified first-price mechanism with a zero minimum bid has revenue of 
N, but no equilibrium of the auction for N individual items has revenue greater than 1.  
11 To illustrate how this can happen at equilibrium, imagine that demand fluctuates between 1 and 2 units 
and that there are three suppliers, each capable of supplying one unit and two capable of supplying 
regulation services by following the load fluctuations. If the two markets for base load and regulation are 
run separately and simultaneously, then there is a necessarily a single bidder in one of the markets.    32
In our theoretical account, simplification can have several advantages. First, in 
multi-product auctions, simplification can save costs by obviating the need to bid 
separately for all the possible alternatives. Second, in the same setting, simplification can 
improve performance because, if bidders can decide what reports to make, they may 
make too few bids or bid for the wrong packages, damaging efficiency and reducing 
revenues. For sponsored search auctions with positive bid costs and without 
simplification, we found that every full-information equilibrium entails zero seller 
revenues (for both the Vickrey design and the series of second-price auctions); in 
contrast, there are no zero-revenue equilibria in suitably simplified versions of these 
auctions. Third, even when bidding costs are zero, the full direct mechanism can have 
multiple Nash equilibria, some of which entail undesired outcomes. The Simplification 
Theorem applies to this zero-cost case, asserting that a simplification satisfying the best-
reply closure property never introduces new equilibria, but may eliminate some equilibria 
by striking one of the equilibrium strategies.  
Our theoretical account captures only some of the important aspects of simplified 
designs. It does not account for learning, which one might conjecture is faster and more 
precise in a simpler mechanism. It does not analyze the confusion that is created by 
complex mechanisms. It omits the resistance of bidders to participating in too complex a 
mechanism. Any of these features could be important.  
Simplification is an essential aspect of practical mechanism design.    33
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